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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
price unless a controlled price is also always required to equal just com-
pensation .... -24 Justice Frankfurter delivered the majority opinion in
United States v. John 7. Felin 6 Co.,25 but dissented in the principal case.
He claimed that the question of compensation was a factual one, and that
though the ceiling price was not irrelevant in resolving compensation, it
should not be the sole determining factor. Continuing, he wrote that
"generally fair and equitable" 26 ceiling prices might give rise to such individ-
ual hardships as to make taking at this price unjust compensation. How-
ever, both justices agreed with the majority that "retention value" was not
to be used in determining compensation. Justice Frankfurter felt that it
was valid to reject retention value because it might be speculative, but be-
cause the Court refused to consider costs in measuring compensation, he
disagreed with the majority. 8
In dciding this case, the Court states that a payment in excess of the
controlled price will be allowed upon proof that this price is not just com-
pensation. However, there is no indication as to what condition or hardship
will be considered sufficient for a payment greater than the established
price. The effect of this decision seems to permit the government to requi-
sition at the same price that was set to restrict inflationary selling. If at
the time of the enactment of this. ceiling price, the legislature had intended
that it should be applied as the measure of just compensation, there might
have been a problem of deciding whether this was a taking of property
without due process,
HABEAS CORPUS-JURISDICTION OF FEDERAL COURTS-
CONFINEMENT BY MILITARY COMMISSION
After the unconditional surrender of Germany and before the cessation
of hostilities with Japan, German citizens engaged in military service for
the Japanese government in China. They were convicted by a Military
Commission of the United States Army in China of violating laws of war,
and were transferred to Germany to serve their sentences. Their petitions
for habeas corpus against the Secretary of Defense were denied in the
District Court, but were reinstated by the Court of Appeals.1 Held, that
although the detaining official is within its territorial jurisdiction, a federal
court does not have jurisdiction of the petition for writ of habeas corpus
by a prisoner who at any relevant time is not. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 70
Sup. Ct. 936 (1950).
24. Id. at 558.
25. See note 22 suptra.
26. 56 STAT. 31, 50 U.S.C. App. J 924 (1942).
27. United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., supra note 23, at 553.
28. Id. at 552.
1. Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
CASES NOTED
Congress has sanctioned military trials and punishment of enemy com-
batants2 during a state or war.8 The authority of the military commission
is judicial in nature.4 It involves a discretion to examine, to decide and to
sentence,5 but its judgments are not subject to review on the merits of the
case.8 The federal courts, on a petition for habeas corpus, are concerned
only with the lawful power of the commission to try the prisoner.'
The Supreme Court has consistently held that it will not take original
jurisdiction in such habeas corpus proceedings,8 unless there is an extreme
necessity for doing so-" However, the Court will exercise appellate juris-
diction, 0 as evidenced by recent cases where it has granted hearings to
petitioners who were within the jurisdiction of some District Court,1' but
has denied them where the sentencing tribunal was not convened under
color of authority of the United States.'
2
The District Courts have the power to issue writs of habeas corpus' s
within their respective jurisdictions.' 4 Such writs are directed to the cus-
todian of the petitioner,15 who must produce the prisoner before the court.'6
Although the petition has been allowed where the prisoner was outside the
District Court's territorial borders,' 7 the weight of authority appears to be
that the hearing will not be granted unless he is within its territorial juris-
diction.' 8
The Court concludes in the instant case that to grant the writ would
greatly endanger any war effort that might be in progress,' 9 It would require
the presence in this country, of the petitioner, his witnesses, and even the
commanding officer who sentenced him,2 0 which in turn would divert the
attention of many important military authorities from the war effort to the
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1486 (1946).
3. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 9 (1946); Kahn v. Anderson, 255 U.S. 1, 29
(1921); MeElrath v. United States, 102 U.S. 426, 428 (1880).
4. See Ex Parte Vallandigham, 1, Wall. 243, 253 (U.S. 1864).
5. Ibid.
6. See In re Yamashita, supra note 3, at'8; Ex parfe Quirin, 317 U.S. I, 22 (1942);
In re Vidal, 179 U.S. 126, 127 (1900).
7. See In re Yamashita, suora note 3, at 9: Ex parte Quirin, supra note 5, at 29.
8. In re Felsch, 337 U.S. 953 (1949); In re Steimle, 337 U.S. 913 (1949); In re
Seidel, 336 U.S. 923 (1949); In re Schmidt, 336 U.S. 923 (1949); In re Heim, 335
U. S: 856 (1948); In re Ekstein, 335 U.S. 851 (1948); In re Hans, 335 U.S. 841 (1948);
In re Stattmann, 335 U.S. 805 (1948); In re Weitzel. 335 U.S. 805 (1948); In re
Gronwald, 335 U.S. 857 (1948); In re Ehlen, 334 U.S. (1948); Brandt v. United
States, 333 U.S. 836 (1948); Milch v. United States, 332 U.S. 789 (1947).
9. In ro Huntington, 137 U.S. 63 (1890); Ex parte Mirzan, 119 U.S. 584 (1887).
10. Ex parte Hung Hang, 108 U.S. 552 (1883).
1I. In re Yamashita, supra note 3; Ex perte Quiin, supra note 6.
12. Koki Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197(1948); 28 U.S.C. § 456 (1946).
13. 28 U.S.C. § 451 (1946).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 452 (1946).
15. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1946).
16. 28 U.S.C. § 458 (1946).
17. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944).
18. Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948); United States v. Day, 50 F.2d 816
3dCir. 1931); ex parts Gouyet, 175 Fed. 230 (D.C. Cir. 1909); In re Boles, 48 Fed.
75 (8th Cir. 1891).
19. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 70 Sup. Ct. 944 (1950).
20. Ibid.
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*civil courts.2' The Court dismisses the prisoners' claim of deprivation of
"due process of law" by the rationale that; the "due process" clause cannot
justifiably apply to enemy aliens where American soldiers do not have a
commensurate right, 22 nor would it be fair to offer use of our courts to
aliens where there would be no equivalent reciprocity from the foreign
state to our soldiers.
-5
The dissent contends that the majority ruling has created a paradox in
the law. 24 If a prisoner of war were to be confined within the territory of
the United States lie would be allowed his hearing, 25 but if the Government
chose to imprison him outside the courts' territorial jurisdiction he would
be denied it on the basis of the present decision.2 6 It goes on further to
state that the Supreme Court, in refusing jurisdiction, has abdicated its
sole means of checking upon the actions of military tribunals.2 7
Apparently, as a result of the instant decision, the military commissions,
outside the jurisdiction of any federal court, are now a separate and distinct
unit empowered to function without any review by the judicial system, but
past decisions 28 show that it is not unusual to leave expansive powers in
other parts of the Government during time of war. It is problematical
whether the courts will again be concerned with this problem in view of
the possibility that the United Nations will, in the future, take jurisdiction
over such prisoners. As in the Korean situation, war will most likely be
carried on under color of authority of the United Nations. Punishment of
the perpetrators of war will be the manifest responsibility of that organiza-
tion, and the United States, if it establishes military tribunals for such pur-
poses, will only be doing so as its agent.
JUDGES-PENSIONS-WAIVER WHILE HOLDING
OTHER PUBLIC OFFICE
A retired judge of the state of Florida received retirement pay' from
a fund, established by statute,2 to which contributions were voluntarily
made, The state constitution provided that if he filed a certificate of willing-
ness, a retired judge could be recalled to active duty.A Upon appointment
21. Ibid.
22. Id. at 947.
23. Id. at 944.
2-4. Id. pt 952 (dissenting opinion).
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
27. Id. at 958(dissenting opinion).
28. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1943); United States v. Ctrtiss-\Vright
IExport Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
1. Retirement pay, as distinguished from a pension, is received from a fund to which
employee contributed. See Raines v, Board of Trustees, 365 1. 610, 7 N.I'2d 489
(1937).
2. FLA. STAT. § 38.14 (1949).
3. Fk.. CONsr. Art. 5, § 49 (erroneously numbered § 46 by the legislature).
